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Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov did not attend the Duma debate on the no
confidence motion last week, despite a
personal invitation from Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznev. On March 14, he
attributed his actions to his belief that
only one faction was out to get him – rather than the whole Duma. The
prime minister was referring to the
Communist faction, which initiated the no-confidence motion.
Nobody knows exactly what the president told Kasyanov to do.
However, knowing Vladimir Putin's style, it is
reasonable to assume that Kasyanov was told to make up his own mind.
Whether Kasyanov was right to ignore the invitation will become
clear in May, when there is a cabinet
reshuffle. At present, Kasyanov stands a fair chance of keeping his
position; but no one can say with any degree
of accuracy what will happen two months from now. Even a light blow or
push can mark the difference between
victory and defeat in politics. It would appear that Kasyanov created a
new enemy on March 14: Boris Nemtsov,
leader of the Union of Right-Wing Forces faction, who threatened the
government with another vote of no
confidence this autumn unless it launches the economic reforms promoted
by the right-wing. In Nemtsov's opinion,
if the right is in favour of something, it cannot be wrong. First and
foremost, he demands that the cabinet
implement three reforms: pensions, military, housing and utilities.
Nemtsov was visibly angered by Kasyanov's
refusal to turn up at the Duma for the debate on the vote of no
confidence in his government. Nemtsov was
heard to mutter, "I promise him serious problems." Nemtsov's
determination to make life difficult for the Prime
Minister was also supported by the leaders and Yabloko and Fatherland -
All Russia.
Nemtsov's friends can't be taken very seriously. After all, the
Union of Right-Wing Forces is not the largest
faction in the Duma. Moreover, the Constitution says that the president,
not parliament, can dismiss the Cabinet.
However, it should be noted that not a single faction leader in the
lower house had a kind word to say about
Kasyanov during the debate. The RTR network provided live coverage of
criticism of Kasyanov from the left (which
is standard procedure, and could therefore be ignored) - and the right
(which is worse, as the government’s
economic policies are primarily supported by the centre and the right).
This detail alone can only serve to weaken
the prime minister's position in government battles to come.
In other words, even the failure of the no confidence motion
proposed by the Communists will have dire
consequences for the government.
The Unity faction is the real casualty of the whole crisis. Unity
added fuel to the flames of the crisis, with its
sudden decision to support the Communist motion, with the aim of
disbanding the "unconstructive" Duma and
securing a (highly debatable) victory for Unity at subsequent early
parliamentary elections. Just one week later,
Unity backed down.
As a result, even observers who are not very experienced in big-
time politics came away with the impression
that either Unity had blindly followed the orders of the Kremlin, which
made a fool out of Unity; or the Unity
leaders had come up with the idea on their own, and acted clumsily. It
is hard to say which of these conclusions
would be less damaging to Unity.
Moreover, the internal integrity of pro-presidential forces in the
lower house of parliament was put to a serious
test. Unity faction members openly criticised their leaders. The
People's Deputy group - the most loyal element of
Unity until now - went so far as to flatly refuse to vote for the
no-confidence motion, and condemned its Unity
allies.
At first sight, the Communists should be described as the winners.
Indeed, they appear to have achieved their
objectives. They got plenty of free media coverage, presented their
radical supporters with undeniable evidence
of their opposition – and simultaneously avoided any serious trouble,
such as the actual disbandment of the Duma
or dismissal of the government.
At the same time, it may well transport that this victory will be
tainted. The scandal over the vote of no
confidence provoked another wave of speculation about upcoming revisions
to the agreement on the breakdown
of leading positions in the Duma. This prospect is particularly likely
now that Alexander Kotenkov, presidential
representative in the Duma, and leaders of most factions, openly support
a revision.
The left can say that it isn't afraid of anything and is prepared
for such a turn of events (as the Communists
are actually saying); but the loss of the positions of Duma speaker and
heads of committees would constitute a
harsh blow. After all, it is common knowledge that the Communists use
the parliament's organisational and material
resources to promote their own purposes and objectives. This is
particularly true during election campaigns, when
the Duma is essentially transformed into their campaign headquarters. No
more access to the feeding trough will
make it that much harder for the Communist Party to operate.
As for the "conditionally pro-presidential factions" (Fatherland -
All Russia, the Union of Right Forces, and
Yabloko), they surely benefited from the crisis.
Firstly, the right and the centre displayed some political resolve,
which looked particularly praiseworthy against
the background of Unity's unprecedented indecisiveness. They achieved
this goal by steadily criticising the vote
of no confidence and plans to eventually disband the Duma.
Secondly, Yabloko and the Union of Right-Wing Forces gladly took
advantage of the platform provided by the
Communists to promote their own programmes. Again, they did so at a time
when Boris Gryzlov of Unity, perplexed
by the speed and severity of the setbacks to his faction, refrained from
making a full-length speech.
Thirdly, these smaller factions - victims of the January 2000 plot,
when the three largest factions (the
Communists, Unity, and People's Deputy) divided most Duma committees
among themselves – now have a chance
to even the score and deprive the Communists of the committees they now
hold. If the revision does happen,
these smaller factions will play a key role in the new ruling coalition;
with the Communists in opposition, the
President will be able to make the Duma pass the laws he needs and which
are now curtailed without support from
Fatherland - All Russia, the Union of Right Forces, and Yabloko.
It is particularly difficult to gauge how the Kremlin fared in the
crisis.
On the one hand, the presidential administration was not openly
involved in the no-confidence vote scandal.
The president himself commented on the issue (via Seleznev) three days
before the vote, when Unity was already
hinting at the possibility of changing its initial position.
On the other hand, no one in Russia will believe that Unity could
have voted for a motion of no confidence in
the Cabinet without explicit orders from the Kremlin. In this case, an
evaluation of the president's gains and losses
depends entirely on the Kremlin’s actual goals.
If the presidential team was really seeking to disband the Duma and
hold early parliamentary elections, these
plans proved abortive.
If the idea of disbanding the Duma was just a red herring, meant to
remind the Communists of their proper
place in the greater scheme of things, the apparent defeat is actually a
victory. Unity gave up its idea of
supporting the vote of no confidence after Putin held a private meeting
with Zyuganov - a meeting which the
Kremlin says the Communist leader demanded. Most probably, Zyuganov
expressed contrition during his audience
with Putin; and the Kremlin decided that this was enough to call off the
process.
Sources in the Kremlin say the question of disbanding the Duma is
still open. They say that it will be raised
again this autumn. The purpose is to split the presidential and
parliamentary elections and establish a two-year
interval between the major federal election campaigns.
See also:
Speech in the State Duma by the First Deputy Head of the Yabloko faction
Sergei Ivanenko during the discussion of the draft resolution of the Duma
“On No-Confidence Vote to the Government”
Moscow, the State Duma, March 14, 2001
Russian Duma Rejects Government No-Confidence Motion
By Ron Popeski, Reuters, March 14, 2001
Putin Faces Cabinet Upheaval
St Petersburg Times, #650, Tuesday, March 6, 2001
Declaration on attitude to the Government of Mikhail Kasyanov
The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, The State Duma
of the Russian Federation, The Yabloko faction, February 20, 2001
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