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To
a 10 year anniversary of the "500 Days" Programme
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A Modern Assessment
of the “500-Days Programme”
A.G.Sushkevich,
expert of the Apparat of the Yabloko faction
August 10, 2000
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The “500-Days Programme” can be assessed according to the following criteria:
1. The programme represents an intellectual reaction
to the socio-economic problems of the 1980s-1990s.
From this point of view the programme represents
the following:
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a complete break with existing
views, academic concepts, the mass media and journal
publications with respect to interpretation of
society’s economic problems;
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the first attempt to circulate
intellectually a completely new terminology and
set of concepts, which subsequently assumed an
independent life in the public conscience;
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the first attempt to achieve radical
change in ethical assessments of social and economic
phenomena (“unemployment” not as an absolute evil,
but as a normal economic phenomenon within certain
boundaries; “price growth” as a possible instrument
of economic policy, rather than a manifestation
of uncontrolled economic chaos; “a reduction in
capital investments and fixed assets” as a useful
process, rather than a symptom of economic collapse,
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etc);
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in general, this was stated publicly
for the first time, including a very detailed
academic forecast for society; society’s anticipated
experiences were stated explicitly in a very brief
form; in terms of genre, this work represents
a forecast rather than a programme of actions;
the first academic forecast, which consistent
a single and consistent organisational idea, even
though naive chronologically.
2. In terms of integrity, i.e. the ability to provide
a picture of the society’s dynamics and offer a
solution, not only to the problems inherited by
society at the beginning of the 1990, but also those
emerging due to implementation of the programme’s
reformist measures, the programme represents the
following:
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a completely clear and conscientious
attempt to describe in words the problems engendered
by the reforms; therefore this programme represents
a significant transfer from the declaration of
the “final solution to the problem” to a positive
(academic) resolution of socio-economic problems,
which deliberately admits discussions, the differing
interests of different social groups, assuming
that a successful act of reforms in society represents
a direction of public development rather than
a list of measures;
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the programme predicted the main
lines of dissolution in society, correctly pinpointed
the crux of possible conflicts in the event of
the implementation of radical economic reforms;
labour conflicts, differentiation in society in
terms of the level of welfare; the regional and
structural aspects in the programme are supplied
with buffer measures;
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the document was written by people
with theoretical knowledge of socio-economic developments,
rather than practical experience of reforming
a national economy; many “automatically built-in
stabilisers “of the programme are purely speculative.
Either there was no practical experience of their
use in the economy or the authors did not have
access to such data. Consequently, it overestimated
the positive aspects (first of all we are speaking
here about the faith of the authors in regulated
prices, the stabilizing influence of state rule,
the possibility of a “global price contract” throughout
the country, etc.);
3. Further practical implementation of the programme.
From this point of
view, the programme represents the following:
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it was completely used in a single
possible form: as a forecast, it represented a
starting point for the absolute majority of further
attempts at economic reforms and was a real alternative
to the reform efforts of Gaidar’s government;
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throughout 1991-1996 it was regarded
not only as an intellectual challenge to the actions
of Gaidar’s and Chernomyrdin’s governments, but
also as a programme of actions of a political
force enjoying a stable backing in Russian society;
the programme is unrivalled in this sense. No
other documents were referred to as part of “a
programme” and similar topics and the range of
issues did not manage to “live” in the public
conscience of Russia during the reform period
for such a long time; - it is still topical as
an integral approach to conducting reforms that
does not split up “social” and “technological”
reforms or “structural” reforms from “reform of
the agro-production complex”, etc.
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was not and could not have been
consistently (literally) implemented, as it only
assumed that a civil society would be created
in Russia and required the benevolence of the
authorities for its practical implementation and
use of compulsory measures by the authorities,
which the authorities did not grant to the reformers,
as they were aware that it wouldn’t retain the
type of power it previously enjoyed in a civil
society;
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as it is targeted at the authorities,
the programme sets extremely stringent demands
on the intellectual level of the former, their
honesty and competence;
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the programme greatly underestimated
the impact of the most important factors, which
moulded the social pattern of Russia in all periods
of its history: the extremely low level of civil
consciousness of Russians citizens, colossal venality
of the state bureaucracy, underdeveloped traditions
of business ethics, the vagueness and confusion
of the moral foundations of society.
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