The myth of a struggle between so-called liberals and
siloviki within the presidential administration has proven surprisingly
durable. In fact, moral and political unity reigns among the political
elite.
The liberals, after all, are people like Alexei Kudrin,
German Gref and Anatoly Chubais, who have long nursed the dream of a Russian
Pinochet implementing reforms with an iron fist, and who are perfectly
happy
with the authoritarian nature of the current regime.
And the well-heeled siloviki are hardly foes of private
property. Their recent friction with the Yeltsin-era oligarchs is nothing
more than a millionaires' rebellion against the billionaires.
Both groups are actively working to implement a model of
authoritarian modernization that does not serve the country's strategic
interests. This unity does not, however, exclude some healthy personal
and
clan feuds over the "control of revenue streams."
On the whole, this model fulfills the dream of the Soviet
party and intelligence nomenklatura that dreamed up perestroika in the
mid-1980s. In the last 20 years, this group has managed once more to
concentrate power entirely in its own hands. Its members have amassed
huge
personal fortunes that were once off-limits. And it has achieved a
completely different lifestyle than was possible in the Soviet era.
Most importantly, the ruling elite has shed any last
remnant of social responsibility. It no longer needs to keep up the fiction
of working for the good of the common man. Now it proudly declares that
market reforms are the nation's top priority and mercilessly implements
these reforms. Political types close to the Kremlin extol managed democracy,
enlightened authoritarianism, bolstering the executive chain of command
and
subduing opposition media outlets.
What is the purpose of this massive ideological effort
aimed at creating a unity of opinion and a regime of personal power? Why
are
generals moving becoming governors and presidential envoys? What enemy
is
this enormous, repressive ideological and police apparatus directed against?
The oligarchs? They've sworn loyalty to the regime,
anxiously hand over their golden eggs and invest in ski resorts and
presidential seaside retreats.
The millions of average people who lost their shirts as a
result of reform? They're dispirited, apathetic and reconciled to life
on
the verge of poverty.
Intellectuals who make no attempt to conceal their
aesthetic hostility toward the new regime and its leaders? The few who
remain can easily be frightened into submission or exiled.
The solution to this riddle can be found on the Kremlin's
own web sites. The court wizards have long considered the construction
of
the executive chain of command and the purge of the media a job well done.
Now it's time to move forward with the "unpopular measures"
contained in
Gref's program like revoking subsidies for housing, education and
healthcare, evicting people who don't pay their bills and raising the
retirement age to 65. There is no need to fear a popular backlash because
the fallout from these measures will not be televised, and that means
it
simply won't exist.
The political class has been promising "unpopular
measures" throughout the last 20 years of reform. And in all that
time they
have been very successful in implementing measures that made them all
rich,
and were therefore wildly popular in their own narrow circle.
Liberal and chekist ideologues alike have clearly
formulated the logic of the big push to modernize Russia in President
Vladimir Putin's second term. By drastically cutting spending on social
programs the government will be able to cut taxes as well. Freed from
this
burden, the business community will respond to such enlightened and liberal
macroeconomic signals with robust growth and job creation. Stripped of
government subsidies, the poor will work like the dickens in these new
jobs.
Wages will more than replace the handouts they have lost. All that's
required is a little patience; a bright future is just around the bend.
At least that's what it says in Western economics
textbooks. And that's actually what happens in developed countries and
the
few developing countries that those textbooks are based on. But Russian
business, busy shuttling between Courchevel and Lefortovo, squeezed by
organized crime and corrupt bureaucrats, will not react to these classic
macroeconomic signals.
For the nth time in the last few centuries, the regime is
bent on achieving a major leap forward by subjecting the people to terrible
privation, driving them into the bright future with a whip.
The new lords of the Kremlin have it all planned out. But
this time the obedient, emaciated old horse might not hold up under the
strain.
The author is a member of the YABLOKO party
See also:
the original at
www.themoscowtimes.com
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