By tradition, the CPRF [RF Communist Party] will lean on the "red belt" -- the group of regions of the Central and Central-Chernozem regions, the North Caucasus, the Volga region, south of Siberia and the Far East, where the party's popularity is traditionally higher than it is for the average Russian. Here virtually all the administrative resources of the CPRF, that is, the Communist governors, are concentrated. In the Russian regions, however (the territories and oblasts), the role of these resources are limited (they usually account to no more than 10 percent of the votes). Moreover, almost all governors are forced to turn over at least some of them to the party in power, and over the past three years the Communists have mainly lost their positions in regional legislative authorities. Moreover, the majority of the "red" regions are distinguished by a fairly small population size (the exception being Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories), and the CPRF results are not usually very high in highly populated areas.

Unity achieved its greatest success in 1999 in the Russian regions and "generally Russified" republics, and Fatherland -- in the parts of the RF, where the administrative resources are stronger (up to 50 percent). In all, in four regions (Moscow, Moscow Oblast, Tatarstan and Bashkiria), it obtained exactly half its votes for the country as a whole. Over the past three years, the party in power has suffered a perceptible decline in support, its internal structures are as a rule weak and dependent, and the administrative resources, as has already been mentioned, are very limited in the territories and oblasts, except for very rare exceptions (Kemerovo and Orel oblasts). United Russia is therefore mainly counting on the regions where these resources are strong (apart from the highly populated Tatarstan and Bashkiria, these are Mordovia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan, Ingushetia and a number of autonomous districts where the population is small). The leaders of these republics are as a rule quite independent characters, capable of playing their own game. In addition, if the republic's leaders are potentially able to "pump" almost all the former "Fatherland" votes over to United Russia, this game plan will not work in Moscow -- here the elector is far more independent. Meanwhile, in Moscow, Fatherland obtained almost 1.9 million votes, the loss of which would be an extremely perceptible blow for the party in power.

The SPS [Union of Right Forces] lost virtually all its small administrative resources during the last year: the head of the Altay Republic, the mayors of Kyzyl and Vladimir lost the elections, the chairmen of the Moscow city duma and the ZS of Nizhni Novgorod Oblast left the party: only the chairman of the Kaliningrad Oblast Duma was left. Even earlier, Samara's governor Titov left the SPS -- in 1999 he had guaranteed almost 6 percent of their votes for the right throughout Russia. Yabloko never had any resources. In this case the popularity of the democrats is traditionally high in highly populated regions (both capitals, a number of large territories and oblasts in the Urals, Siberia and the Volga region), which helped them overcome the 5-percent barrier. Both parties have quite a few serious regional divisions.

The Russian regions of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, where the population is as a rule small, and its activity at elections is also low, have recently provided support for the LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia]. It is possible, however, that at the forthcoming elections the party will partially restore its positions in the "red" regions of European Russia. The LDPR has no administrative resources.

All the basic parties will wage a tough struggle in Moscow for Fatherland's heritage at the coming elections. St. Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk Kray, and Nizhni Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk and Rostov oblasts, where the population is quite high, administrative resources are limited (moreover, only in Rostov and Irkutsk oblasts will they be fully handed over to United Russia) will also become critically important, and all the parties have a chance of obtaining a perceptible result. The CPRF is trying to regain Voronezh Oblast, which fell out of the "red belt," according to the results of the recent federal and local elections. If Konstantin Titov takes part in the elections as one of the leaders of the social-democrats, his party will gain many votes in Samara Oblast. The SDPR [Social Democratic

Party of Russia] cannot help this -- throughout the country as a whole it can scarcely garner even 2 percent of the votes -- but on the other hand, all the other parties will incur serious losses on the Volga. Yet another anomaly may spring up in Perm Oblast, one of the "whitest" regions in the country (the size of the population here is also quite high). Viktor Pokhmelkin, who is very popular in this region, may also ensure a high result for Liberal Russia. This will not help the party as a whole either, but it will damage the SPS and Yabloko, which must do well in the West Urals.

The "Party against everyone" may this time achieve substantial successes, above all in some of the aforementioned critically important regions. There will also be quite a few "refuseniks" in the Far East. They will come primarily from the former electroate of Unity and the SPS, the main winners in the 1999 elections, which may be the main losers in 2003.

See also:

State Duma elections 2003

Vremya MN, February 18, 2003