| The latest round of talks about campaign cooperation
between the Union of Right-Wing Forces We have not seen much coherent
commentary in Russia on a decision made by the European Union
in early October to accept ten new members in 2004 (Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta,
and Cyprus). However, this move is much more important and fraught
with more significant consequences than the news about NATO eastward
expansion which once caused Russia to dig in its heels. All attention
is being focused on one side-effect alone - resolving the Kaliningrad
dilemma and the tug-of-war between Brussels and Moscow - although
it is quite clear which side will be forced to make the greater
concessions when finding a compromise.
Not only do the residents of the Kaliningrad region face difficulties;
so do all Russian citizens, who face the prospect of a new "curtain".
Russian politicians are reluctant to provide an honest answer
to an uncomfortable question: why did our former fellow-travellers
in the socialist camp - Lithuania (remember who is responsible
for its added territory), Latvia, and Estonia – (which lived
in the same state as Russia for many years and regained with Russia's
support the statehood they had barely attained in the 1920s and
1930s, but still couldn't shake off their inferiority complex)
turn away from the Russian Federation, and look to the West?
EU expansion is prompting Russia to re-evaluate its strategic
priorities and decide whether it ought to remain the centre of
gravity for the CIS and try to consolidate the CIS under its aegis
(while Ukraine, Georgia and others now look to the US and prosperous
parts of Europe in their foreign policy agendas); or continue
the process of Westernization which began in the 1990s and make
steps to join organizations in the West alongside its neighbours,
or even before them. Russia's leaders are in no hurry to plot
out corresponding scenarios. They have forgotten about the Asian
(India and China) direction of foreign policy, which was used
to intimidate the West in the late 1990s; they are more concerned
about domestic difficulties. And the Western nations are in no
hurry to needlessly alter the close-fitting garments of their
main blocs to fit an equally large partner; by inertia they continue
to view Russia as simply a weakened USSR. Were it not for the
aces up Russia's sleeve - its former military might, its huge
territory with promising natural resources and a Soviet legacy
for shaping the climate in international affairs - the West wouldn't
consider Russia , any more than it considers Ukraine or other
CIS nations.
These days, even the United States, whose dollar had no competition
for years, is enviously eyeing the growing might of the united
Europe, with its plans to expand its territory to the south and
east. Especially since most EU nations successfully introduced
the euro, their new currency. But the risks of expansion have
not been fully calculated - not only by the US and Russia, but
by Brussels itself. When it is no longer a matter of 15 nations,
but 25, the question arises: who will pay for the unbearable burden
of such a vast enerprise? The old members of the EU, which have
spent decades bringing their economies and legal systems closer
together, aren't so prosperous at home that they can set aside
part of their budget spending to replenish the coffers of Brussels.
They wouldn't mind making the new members pay their own way. And
the candidate nations are keeping quiet about the need to sustain
some substantial costs before they derive distant benefits.
The forthcoming expansion is already leading to tension within
the EU. Its economically weaker members do have something to protest
about. They are more agriculturally-oriented nations, which are
afraid that subsidies from Brussels will be redistributed. Poland,
the largest candidate nation, is causing the most concern. Its
traditionally substantial agricultural sector cannot withstand
competition. The other nine new members do not differ that much
from Polandin this respect, and the outlook for them - apart from
Cyprus and Malta, perhaps - could turn out to be similar to East
Germany: unemployment, young people moving away, and no prospects
for older citizens. Marked differences of opinion within the EU
cannot be smoothed over, no matter how many commissions are set
up along the lines of the one chaired by Giscard d'Estaing, working
on a constitution for the European Union.
Let us return to the international consequences of the upcoming
EU expansion: former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, an experienced
politician, recently answered a question about the prospects for
EU-Russia relations in line with the views of the Western European
establishment - he said the eastern limits of EU expansion were
the borders with Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia; he did not respond
to a remark as to whether the rapidly-expanding EU might run therisk
of repeating the fate of the Soviet Union. Of course, since September
11 and the changes it caused in Russia's foreign policy, the situation
has altered significantly. These foreign policy changes are most
supported by the middle class in Russia, according to a recently-released
study of how Russians view Europe and Germany.
In Russia today, attitudes have changed about NATO and the EEC,
which had previously been detested by the Soviet leadership. There
is a widespread drive to develop partnership relations. The question
is how many more shake-ups like September 11 will be required
for everyone to realize that mutual long-term interests require
more than the admission ofsmaller nations to those organizations?
They might have to admit Russia - and the advantages of granting
Russia membership would undoubtedly far outweigh the disadvantages
that are carefully calculated in the Brussels headquarters of
both organizations.
See also:
Russia-EU
Relations
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