| The Speaker of the State Duma Gennay Seleznev
announced last week that
he intends to develop the Rossia movement into a real political
party. If
he succeeds, Rossia will essentially become a second communist
party, a
sort of carbon copy of the CPRF. Actually, this fits in with the
logic of
President Vladimir Putin's actions, who seems intent on running
the
country with the help of a system of duplicates.
Despite expectations, Putin has not yet permitted the so-called
Northern Alliance (people with an intelligence background, from
St. Petersburg) to devour Boris Yeltsin's former team. Two key
figures of the team, Alexander Voloshin and Vladislav Surkov,
remain firmly in control of the presidential administration. Moreover,
Putin did not prevent the two teams (from St. Petersburg and Yeltsin's)
from initiating the formation of parallel electoral headquarters.
Unofficially, both were invited to join a quiet contest for the
president's trust and confidence.
Sergei Shoigu's pro-presidential United Russia remains theKremlin's
major electoral project. The St. Petersburg team (its informal
electoral headquarters is associated with Igor Sechin's of Putin's
chancellor's office and Deputy Director of the Presidential Administration
Victor Ivanov) offers the president an alternative, new pro-presidential
Party of Life under Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov.
Putin does not encourage either but does not prevent them from
displaying their loyalty and potential usefulness. He sends a
message in other words, that the appearance of this carbon copy
suits him just fine.
Apparently Putin is out to turn the Union of Right-Wing Forces
(SPS) and Yabloko into a similar pair of mutually interchangeable
twins. On the one hand, SPS appears to remain the Kremlin's favourite.
At least technically. Anatoly Chubais, one of the leaders of this
right-wing party, remains on the state service. Moreover - and
the right take unmistakable pride in this fact - the president
has partially backed their plans for military reforms and regularly
meets with the Union leader Boris Nemtsov. In other words, there
are absolutely no reasons to assume that in the next parliamentary
election the Kremlin may strip the SPS of the administrative resource
they enjoyed in 1999.
On the other hand, Kremlin political technologists' relations
with Nemtsov are fairly complicated. They consider his "too colourful
and not controllable enough." It seems that the president recalled
the old adage of better safe than sorry. That is why he is meeting
with Grigory Yavlinsky, and his administration is maintaining
regular contacts with Yabloko.
When the Duma portfolios were redistributed earlier this year
on the Kremlin's initiative, Yabloko got the committee it had
wanted all along (the education committee). It is not as strategic
or important as, say, the budget committee, but it is the principle
and the mechanism that count. Yabloko got what it had asked for.
These days Yabloko avoids making any sharply-worded statements
concerning the Kremlin. Moreover, Yabloko is silent on its only
noticeable initiative - collection of signatures for a referendum
to ban the import of nuclear waste from abroad. One of Yavlinsky's
associates admitted off the record: "it happened because we initiated
negotiations with the presidential administration and reached
understanding on a wide range of issues."
It stands to reason to assume that should something happen to
mar its relations with the Union of Right-Wing Forces on the eve
of the election, the Kremlin may make Yavlinsky's party the regular
liberal opposition.
Seleznev's Russia is clearly geared to finding its own niche
in the framework of carbon copies. According to our sources, Seleznev
was even promised support by the Kremlin's electoral headquarters
provided he was successful in party-building. The future structure
will be promoted as "a moderate communist party with social-democratic
features." No matter what Gennady Zyuganov does, everything will
be playing into this carbon copy of the communist party. If the
CPRF radicalizes its ideology and stiffens party discipline (fearing
a split and defection of its activities to Russia), Seleznev with
his "human face" will only benefit. If Zyuganov turns liberal,
it will look as if the CPRF was drifting in the direction of its
own copy.
Analogies are endless. Arkady Volsky's Russian Union of Businessmen
and Entrepreneurs becomes obstinate every now and then. To neutralize
it, the Chamber of Commerce and Trade was set up under Yevgeny
Primakov.
Parallelism on TV screens is not denied either. These days, Russia
has two "independent" TV channels set up by the state. For the
Kremlin, the team of Yevgeny Kiselev which swore allegiance to
presidential warden Primakov ironically appears more dependable
than Boris Jordan's NTV.
According to Gallup's ratings, ORT and RTR channels are losing
to NTV now, and their leaders Konstantin Ernst and Oleg Dobrodeev
were summoned to the Kremlin. According to our sources, they refer
their loss of rating to the fact that Jordan "shows in news programmes
protest actions against wage arrears and makes an emphasis on
the flaws of the state." Unless the Kremlin allows Jordan to buy
into the TV channel or kicks him out in favour of someone more
amenable, it will not look like an attack on free media. Because
NTV has a carbon copy, the quasi-independent TVC.
Putin has been using the same method in staff matters as well.
Take the governmental liberal nucleus, the team of German Gref
and Alexei Kudrin, for example. At first sight, they are supposed
to chart economic strategy. On the other hand, the president has
his Advisor Andrei Illarionov as well. Illarionov has been doing
more than whispering something in the president's air, he has
been castigating the government in public.
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov finds himself in a similar situation.
Observers predicted his resignation as soon as Putin began establishing
foreign policy contacts on his own. Sources in the Kremlin openly
announced that the Foreign Ministry's solutions to geopolitical
problems did not satisfy the president owing to their lack of
dynamism and flexibility and reliance on outmoded Soviet stereotypes.
In any case, the president did not fire Ivanov. The minister
retained his post and now has to pay for it with his nerves. The
corridors of power regularly reverberate with "absolutely trustworthy
information" that a replacement for Ivanov has been found and
that he is about to be succeeded by Dmitry Rogozin, Chairman of
the Duma Committee of Foreign Affairs, or by Mikhail Margelov,
head of the analogous committee of the Federation Council. Hapless
Ivanov has two potential doubles at once. As if he wanted to press
home this message, these days the president takes Margelov with
him on foreign trips.
The situation with the Sergei Yastrzhembsky - Alexei Gromov duo
is essentially analogous. Presidential Press Secretary Gromov
is constantly accused of a style of work with the media that would
suit a guard better than an image-maker. According to our sources,
in early May Gromov (also in charge of state-controlled TV channels
and their ideology, unofficially) was summoned for a reprimand
when ORT and RTR began struggling to catch up with NTV.
Voloshin refuses to give up on Gromov. As for the president,
he is openly promoting Yastrzhembsky who in turn constantly badgers
the president with more and more projects for new state propaganda
institutions. There is no love lost between Yastrzhembsky and
Gromov to the extent that both began forming his own press centre
in St. Petersburg for the coming 300th jubilee.
Why would the president want all this?
First of all we live at a time of political stagnation since
Putin imposed informally a moratorium on staff reshuffles at government
level. For Putin therefore this state of affairs is almost the
only way to make ministers do their jobs.
Secondly, all this fits in with Putin's electoral strategy. This
system of doubles enables the president additional room for manoeuvre
on the eve of the election. The lack of progress, say, in the
economy may be pinned on Mr. Sidorov and he could be kicked. Moreover,
the president will be able to immediately replace him with Mr.
Petrov, a duplicate who has been calling Mr. Sidorov a saboteur
all along. Putin will even be able to pretend that he has always
supported Petrov but as a kind man, wanted to give Sidorov a chance
to redeem himself.
In short, this is the traditional logic of the intelligence service:
everyone who sets out for a dangerous mission should have a double,
someone to be used when the agent himself is exposed. Or if the
agent has to be abandoned (or terminated) for political considerations.
By the way, the system of doubles invented and perfected by the
president has even spread into the sphere of political geography.
Putin runs the country from Moscow and St. Petersburg in turns.
Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov frets. He is led to believe that
he may be stripped of his financial privileges. City fathers in
St. Petersburg are forced at least to repair roads and buildings...
It should be noted, however, that there are at least two vacancies
even in the system of doubles.
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov does not have an alter ego, or
at least the public has not been shown this double yet. This situation
may be attributed to the fact that the prime minister does not
have a clear economic concept. A double will become essential
if and when Putin initiates truly dramatic reforms. He will need
a flashy symbolic gesture then.
As for the other vacancy, Putin himself does not have a double.
See also: Parliamentary
Elections, 2003
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