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Regime Changes and Institutional Conditions for the Opposition in Russia
The logics of the development of a "fake democracy,"
i.e. an authoritarian state with a formal presence of democratic
institutions, relates to deconsolidation of democratic institutions
and their delegitimisation in public opinion. Election results
become predictable in general and are, in principle, not changeable.
The ruling group creates a system of shielding mechanisms
and includes a propaganda machine so that to strengthen its
position. This results in reprisals of the people who represent
real or potential (even insignificant) danger for the ruling
system. To ensure compliance of representatives of the political
and business elite, the authorities organize "staged"
reprisals and create external and internal enemies to justify
for such actions. Such actions are authorised by a state controlled
judicial authority. At the same time, blocking legitimate
ways of regime change leads to intensified latent conflicts
and an increased pressure on a society and stimulates emergence
of still very weak forms of resistance.
Democracy as a transitional solution ceases to satisfy the
dominant actor who strives to strengthen his positions. Even
democratic institutions established and guaranteed by the
Constitution start to fade away. Competition vanishes from
election process. "Delegate," "defective,"
limited, monitored, fake democracy is replaced with apparent
authoritarian formations. Furthermore, if we try to apply
Sartori's criteria for the identification of authoritarian
and totalitarian systems in our analysis of characteristics
of regime at this stage, we will see that regime is getting
more and more austere. There is no holistic totalitarian ideology
as such. However, there have been attempts to develop such
ideology and its basic ideas, for example, "an energy
superpower," "a sovereign democracy". There
exists potential and somehow real state control in different
public areas. The number of these areas boradens: politics,
business, culture, education, public organizations. If reprisals
of a non-legal nature (force by terror, to use Sartoti's term)
are employed relatively seldom and selectively (Chechnya,
Blagoveshchensk or show arrests and trials of businessmen,
governors, mayors, as well as so called "spy trials"),
the threat of the use of such repressions (force by fear)
is spread widely through mass media. Subordination of social
subsystems to the state increases.
We can talk about:
- total subservience of the most influential mass media sources,
first of all - television. At the same time, pressure on less
important and local mass media increases. Attempts, partially
successful, are made to control Internet publications and
blogs ;
- the absence of independent jurisdiction;
- "building in" of the Orthodox Church into the
State system in exchange to some privileges;
- first steps in controlling education, which include abandonment
of election procedures of university rectors and the standardization
of educational programs.
The next indicator is isolation or exclusion of so-called
"marginal" social groups. The illustration of this
is the persecution of persons of "Caucasian Nationalities"
and especially the anti-Georgian campaign of the autumn 2006
and indirect fueling by the State of nationalistic feelings
and a policy of exclusion of sexual minorities.
The most obvious cases of abuse of power is the anti-oligarch
campaign, destruction of YUKOS, the imprisonment of Khodorkovsky,
the above mentioned selective persecutions of regional elites
and bans or sanctioning of street manifestations. Examples
of the latter are the sanctioning of the 4th of November 2005
march of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration and other
radical nationalistic groups in Moscow and the ban of an anti-fascist
march of democratic parties and human rights organizations
at the end of November 2005.
The growth of influence of the ruling party is obvious in
spite of some disagreements on how to achieve the party's
goal, that is, secure domination of the party entitled "United
Russia."
The elements of the boosting of the key role of "Chieftan"
are in place. This is exemplified not only in wide public
support of Putin but also is conscious and unconscious construction
of his "cult" (the construction of the image of
a leader equal to world leaders of G8; fad among officials
to wear a watch on the right hand and to hang portraits of
the leader on their offices' walls, etc.).
Finally, state control of economics is increasing by means
of including authority officials in the upper echelon of management
of the largest firms and by State purchase of majority holding
of gas and oil company shares.
By default, it is assumed that a wide consensus exists among
the elites and public in regards to regime-proclaimed values.
Such "consensus by default" is seen by the ruling
groups of elites as state-centralized, with the elements of
nationalism and neo-imperialism and thus, contradicting the
spirit and letter of the current Constitution.
Prospects of the formation of new parties are being blocked
and, as a consequence, articulations and representations of
the interests of newly emerging groups in society are too.
Privileges to administrative parties and increasing restrictions
for opposition parties are "cementing" the party
system and stimulate the emergence of the radical non-systemic
opposition which acts outside institutional frames. On the
other hand, eviction of all civil opposition parties to the
periphery of the political process pushes them into collaborated
actions of protest in election supervision and even in forming
coalitions in legislative bodies .
Finally, renunciation of the competitive election process
and measures directed to strengthening positions of the ruling
coalition mean final renunciation of parties as democratic
institutions which tie up authorities and society. Parties
gradually turn exclusively into an instrument of self-organization
of the ruling elite group. The realization of interests of
the ruling party minimally depends on the will of the citizens.
The level of autonomy of systemic parties is minimal. At the
same time, administrative parties and projects are connected
with various, sometimes competing, factions of the ruling
group. Beside one center of power, substructures emerge. These
substructures are subordinate to the center and administrative
parties depend on them. This results in competition among
substructures. Such competition does not relate to programmatic
positions and political trends. Systemic public parties find
themselves in a complicated situation of contradictions between
programmatic positions and suggested alternative trends. At
the same time, they are subdued by the ruling group. The autonomy
of non-systemic opposition forces is also illusionary. It
shows in their regular activities - registration, appearance
in media, getting permission from the ruling group to conduct
various actions.
The idiosyncratic feature of the political process now is
its imitational character which leads to virtualization and
theatrical character of public politics . Creative potential
of the politicians and parties become a more important resource
than the program, ideological positions or alternative political
courses. It is not by chance that the popularity of Zhirinovsky
is not decreasing. Deputies, according to journalists' opinion,
"compete" in a level of absurdity of proposed bills
(from requirement to obtain permission from the husband to
do an abortion to going back to the Julian calendar). The
sole goal of these is to appeal to the mass media.
Changes in electoral legislation and norms regulating the
activities of the parties, as well as in information politics
of mass media under state control, are directed at securing
guarantee of the victory of the dominant party in elections
on all levels, and at minimization of the role of other parties
and, first and foremost, of the opposition parties .
Consistent and purposeful lessening of the zones of freedom
and creation of imitations of democratic institutions are
accompanied by state rhetoric and, as it seems, contribute
to the strengthening of the positions of the ruling party.
The growth of prices on energy supply resources created exceptionally
favorable conditions for any moves inside the country as well
as abroad.
However, disparity of positions on the one hand and certain
self-restraints of the authorities on the other, do not allow
the regime to be consistent and to begin the ultimate liquidation
of the actors which are potential or realistic threat to the
monopoly position of the dominating actor. These competing
forces include representatives of business groups, regional
elites, opposition parties and movements, even though in their
weakened state.
Contained within the realities of a consistent strengthening
of authoritarian-bureaucratic regime in Russia, there are
several factors which conditioned the trajectory of development
of the party system and the strategy and tactics of the opposition
forces.
Rules of the game changed and this has affected both formal
and informal institutions. A body of new legislative acts
- changes in the law on parties and in electoral legislation
completely altered electoral formula and set up new conditions
for the parties. Kremlin administration and a parliament majority
with guaranteed voting consistently acted in accordance with
the goal of "cleansing of political field." They
created most favorable conditions for the party designated
to become "dominant" in the political system and
most unfavorable conditions for all other parties. In other
words, a party system under total control was created.
In December 2006, a Duma majority passed amendments on the
law on parties. These amendments made difficult conditions
of parties' existence even more difficult and made it practically
impossible to create any new parties which would not be subordinate
to the Kremlin .
Requirements to the membership quota increased (Article 1):
at the moment, a party should have no less than 50 thousand
members. Some party organizations should have no less than
500 and others - no less than 250 members. Article 2 indicated
deadlines to sort out compulsory numbers and branching in
accordance with the requirements of the law of the 1st of
January 2006, i.e. parties had to meet the new requirements
long time before the beginning of the election campaign. Parties
who did not satisfy the requirements of the law on parties
were ordered to self liquidate and to transform into public
organizations. Otherwise, they would be liquidated by the
court order. Passing of this legislation meant an "X-hour"
for small parties which practically lost any right to exist
as political subjects.
Strict norms of the law “On parties” which inured were complemented
by changes in electoral legislation. The following became
the key norms, which practically altered electoral formula:
1) Introduction of 7% blocking-off barrier on a federal level
and, following this, the 2006 change of regional electoral
legislation which increased barriers in regions (most often
5% but in some region, for example, Maritime Territory - 3%)
up to 7%.
2) Introduction of proportional electoral system on the federal
level. The federal list should not include more than 3 names
and the list itself should be split into 100-150 regional
lists.
4) Ban on public organizations' participation in electoral
units.
5) "Tacit" option for the parties presented in Duma
to nominate candidates for elections on all levels. Complexities
for other, non-Parliament, parties to nominate their candidates.
6) Raising of the election tax from 37.5 to 60 million rubles
and subsequent corresponding changes in regional electoral
legislations.
7) Lowering the allowed level of "defects" in collecting
signatures from 25% to 10% and constraints for people who
organize activities to collect signatures to nominate a party
make such activities virtually impossible. Bar on simultaneous
collection of signatures and making a deposit, which makes
"guarantee" mechanism impossible ("guarantee"
mechanism meant that parties could make a deposit in case
of a high level of "defects").
9) Introduction of an imperative mandate and the loss of deputy
status when leaving the faction.
10) Bar on blocks and then a bar on participation of members
of one party in the lists of another party.
11) Preservation of the so-called “locomotives”, i.e. a governor
heading federal and regional lists can pass his mandate to
a candidate following him in the list (de-personification)
13) The right of the party which wins in regional elections
to nominate the candidate for the position of a governor
14) Amendments to the law "On Counteracting Extremist
Activities" which expand definitions of extremism and,
practically, allow officials to label any opposition to the
ruling power and criticism of it as extremist activity.
15) Lifting restrictions from pre-term voting.
19) Cancellation of the attendance bar.
19) Ban on criticism of other parties, competitors in election
process.
Amendment, which looked as separate measures, when taken on
their own, in sum have led to constriction of the range of
activities of the parties who do not relate to the ruling
power . Change of the ruling power at the elections is very
unlikely.
Another consequence of these norms which made elections campaigns
easy for administration parties and difficult for opposition
parties is a practical loss of enormous numbers of citizens
of both active and passive electoral legislation. This is
not Constitutional . It is noteworthy that an institutional
choice allowing to minimize political competition appeared
to be insufficient. The logic of development of authoritarian
regime forces power groups to guarantee through legislation
its dominant position. Potential competitors have less zones
of freedoms and less options. Combination of the President's
popularity among citizens and his acceptance by international
community, high oil prices and termidorian feelings among
elite (to make order, to strengthen the chain of commands,
to restrain those who got too high in the previous decade)
could not last forever. This is why, any "struggle of
sections" or a "section" which were too autonomous
from the whole was perceived as a threat to "Putin's
consensus of elites."
Elections, which have already lost any feature of competitiveness,
are gradually losing the option of alternative. Parties are
presented with some kind of "property qualification"
or "administrative qualification."
By the end of 2004 - beginning of 2005, registration service
of the Ministry of Justice began full audits of parties in
regions. These audits did not only check the numbers of members
through documents and through selective telephone calls and
visits of the enlisted members, but also checked meeting minutes,
including local meetings, and their conformity to the legislation
and the party charter. The demands placed on the parties could
only be satisfied by state institutions with permanent active
bureaucratic apparatus.
The inevitable consequence for the parties: beside United
Russia and the parties who were consigned with a special function
(for example, spoiler) by authorities, only those parties
which managed to provide the necessary documentation and firm
membership base survived. That was true in those cases when
there was no command "attack" because any public
organization was not able to meet 100% requirements. Members
of the opposition parties must have courage and firm convictions
not to give up party membership under current circumstances.
Meanwhile, those who did not have any chances to survive as
an independent player fell into worsening position. For those
who stayed in the field, chances increased, and any incentives
to join in with weaker players disappeared.
Furthermore, the new electoral formula allows existence without
complex amalgamation of two or three parties into one with
the inevitable program compromises and mutual concessions
and lowering the status of the management. Those who were
left "outside the game" and lost the status of a
party and, consequently, could not participate in elections,
had to agree to conditions dictated by those who remained
in the political field or to "sell short" and proclaim
regime and election non legitimate.
At the end of 2006, the Central Information Office officially
announced that 19 parties underwent audit and 16 parties were
found not to satisfy requirements of the legislature . All
parties who were refused registration insisted that the audit
procedure violated federal legislation and were very critical
of the process. "This was not an audit but an attempt
to fulfill the state order to liquidate unwanted parties,"
said Viktor Cherepkov, the leader of the "Freedom and
Democracy Party" .
Those who did not pass the state registration service audit,
chose several different strategies. Independent Deputy of
the State Duma Vladimir Ryzhkov who had hopes on resurrection
of the Republican Party and planned to head democratic opposition,
contested the audit results through the court. After he lost
his case in the Supreme Court, Ryzhkov appealed to Strasburg
Court of Human Rights.
Parties and Public Organizations in the Liberal Section
of Political Specter
Parties YABLOKO and The Union of Right Forces, who lost
the Parliament status in December 2003, became targets of
immense criticism of journalists and politicians who were
in opposition to them. Political scientists and political
technologists evaluated their chances for future as minimal.
SPS (the Union of Right-Wing Forces) announced a change of
management. Leaders of the party resigned and I. Khamakada
left the party. SPS, still possessing huge resources, did
not have a leader for a year and a half until the party discovered
a promising backwoodsman from Perm, Nikita Belykh. The party
gained a few victories during first regional elections, however,
the number of successes was going down. The main problem of
SPS, which supported the President till the State Duma electoral
campaign of 2007, was its political identity. Domination by
the "United Russia" which still has a liberal wing,
put into question the necessity of having another player on
the same field. Attempts of Nikita Belykh and his supporters
to express opposition views placed them in close quarters
with YABLOKO and prejudiced their chances to continuous funding.
Anatoly Chubais, who was directly subordinate to the Kremlin,
could not finance the party from his business projects. SPS
leaders openly stated that they did not have any chances to
get over 7% barrier in 2007. After Moscow elections, a few
representatives of SPS conducted separate negotiations with
YABLOKO leaders and were ready to leave their party in exchange
to obtaining significant positions in YABLOKO.
During informal agreements of leadership representatives
in 2006, the parties tried to "separate" regions.
Until change of legislation and the introduction of the ban
on participation in the lists of other parties, SPS members
participated in some regional elections on YABLOKO's ticket.
SPS was on the verge of the split in its ranks. However, after
SPS list received 16.5% votes during elections in Perm Region
in December, SPS Congress of 16.12.2006 announced that the
party was going to stop negotiations with YABLOKO and was
planning to participate on its own in all regional elections.
A. Chubais and, following him, SPS leadership dependent on
financial and administrative support, chose to keep political
structure which would be loyal to the Kremlin and to dissociate
themselves from the opposition. The subsequent regional elections
were conducted and the agitators were paid commission for
gained results. The major theme of elections was increase
of retirement pensions. SPS began to work on an alien ideological
field and that angered communists and "Fair Russia."
YABLOKO, in spite of vigorous internal party discussions,
preserved its position and its leadership. The party managed
to survive practically without financial resources up until
the end of 2005 due to the change of algorithm of interaction
between party leadership and regional organizations, changes
in programmatic statements, activisation of relations with
civil organizations and protest actions. The absence of resources,
however, did not allow the party to gain significant victories
in regional elections. By the middle of 2006, the party managed
to acquire legal status and run a unification congress.
During Vladimir Putin's second presidential term, the time
of curtailing of democratic institutions and changing of the
vector of transformation, a situation emerges which is similar
to the period of liberalization, that is mobilization and
politicization of Civil organizations. The difference is in
the correlation with the vector of political development:
during the period of democratization, non formal organizations
were fighting for their freedoms and regime change; now, legal
public organizations are forced to defend freedoms and rights
obtained earlier and defend their autonomy from the state
which they gradually lose. Ruling powers, who were retreating
then, even though not without resistance, have in their possession
at the moment different institutions, selective repressions
and imitation (fake) institutions.
Public organizations remained on the periphery of the ruling
powers' attention during the entire period that followed regime
change and election of democratic institutions as transitional
solution. Public organizations were used as a supplementary
resource or an instrument for attraction of western donors
.
During Putin's first presidential term, the attempt (Civil
Forum) to regularize public organizations and to use them
as supplementary resource to legitimize regime failed. Civil,
especially human rights organisations, were financially independent
from ruling powers; they used western donors and were not
eager to line up in the institutional chain of command. On
the other hand, ruling powers did not have time for these
organizations then. More important problems had to be solved
in order to consolidate power: re-centralisation, building
of manageable parliament and party system, subordination of
business groups, etc. During Putin's second term, these tasks
were already fulfilled. The "colour" revolutions
in the post-Soviet states demonstrated that non-profit organisations
can become nucleus of the organized public protests which
might lead to the loss of power by ruling elites. This is
why, the politics of "segregation" toward non-profit
organisations came into being. It should be noted here that
the elements of the following type of interaction - creation
of common chambers under governors, creating obstacles for
activities of human rights organizations, show trials - also
took place earlier. At the moment, a "broad-scale attack"
has begun.
First of all, the law on public organizations was ratified.
This law considerably complicated conditions of organizations'
existence and put restrictions on receiving funds from western
donors, practically their sole source of funds. Critics of
this law, inside the country and abroad likewise, noted that
the ratified law contradicts current Constitution of Russia
as well as international standards of people's rights to create
public organizations and express opinion. The law considerably
limits autonomy of non-profit organisations and puts them
under state control.
Second, Public Chamber was created, which received exclusive
right to act on behalf of civil society. Public Chamber is
designed to play the role of a "proper" civil society
and, beside its "multifunctional" utilisation, it
can be used as a well-controlled stage for public politics
and a supplementary mechanism for putting pressure on officials.
Third, the threat to lose their positions forces western sponsors
to act with caution or to give up their work in Russia altogether
(like George Soros).
Fourth, a campaign to discredit most influential human rights
organisations has been launched. In this campaign, familiar
Soviet tricks are used - accusation of human rights organizations
of Western support and espionage activities.
The nature of activities of human rights and ecological organizations
is such that they are supposed to influence government on
behalf of public. These organizations find themselves in difficult
position. Their activities which were not considered political
before are now treated as political, and the organizations
themselves are treated by authorities as political opponents.
Worsening of living conditions for human rights organizations
forces them to change their attitude toward liberal parties.
Back in 2003, "Memorial", Moscow Helsinki group,
"Golos" (Voice) and others rejected institutional
collaboration with liberal parties because of the fear that
they would be "used", and preferred only personal,
even though close, contacts. On the other hand, human right
activists worked together with authorities and participated
in various councils on human rights under the auspices of
the President, Duma, and they even participated actively in
the Civil Forum, the first Kremlin's attempt to create "chain
of commands of the Civil society" subordinate to regime.
Currently, the ruling authorities are practically "pushing"
these organizations toward political activity. By their nature
and functions, these organizations are not capable of engaging
in political activities. This is why they require political
partners which have vertical structure and resources of various
sorts.
There existed several different directions in cooperation
between public organizations and opposition parties.
1) Attempts of human rights organizations to found their own
parties ("United People's Party of Soldiers' Mothers,"
"Green Russia," Human Right Activists (initiative
of Lev Ponomaryov) failed. These attempts stopped after thickening
of the legislation (see below). Most of the organizations
which planned to engage in their own political activity, have
chosen some existing political party as "their party."
2) Creation of a new type of broad conglomerations which would
include not only human rights organizations but also parties,
political organizations and prominent politicians. Civil Congress
was created in December 2004 on the initiative of a non formal
association "Za pravo vybora" ["For the rights
of choice"] (which included a number of influential non-profit
organisations, e.g. the Moscow Helsinki Group and Association
"Golos"), founded as a result of joint work on claims
for judicial inquiry to challenge results of 2003 elections,
and with direct participation of YABLOKO. Representatives
of all influential human rights organizations from various
regions and prominent politicians of democratic wing took
part in the work of this Congress. Permanent network in operation
was established. After the second Congress and more than a
year of joint work on various projects, representatives of
human rights organizations regarded as rather natural their
work in structures which included parties. SPS, whose representatives
participated before in the Action Committee of VGK [All-Russian
Civil Congress], proclaimed itself a member of the Committee
after Moscow elections. A number of human rights organizations
participating in the work of the Action Committee increased.
But positional disagreements among leaders and organizations,
which are reminiscent of the times of split of umbrella movements,
led to the alteration of the VGK structure and its shift to
the system of individual membership. At the same time, several
politicians who do not have parties for various reasons (G.
Kasparov and United Civil Front, M. Kasyanov and his National-Democractic
Union, E. Limonov and his National-Bolsheviks) and representatives
of human rights organizations set up "left-right"
coalition "The Other Russia" in the middle of 2006.
This coalition is a pretender to the status of major opposition
force to the Kremlin. One year later, after a series of non
sanctioned manifestations (the March of the Dissenting), the
coalition starts falling apart. Kasyanov and Ryzhkov leave,
so do a few human rights organizations.
3) Attempts of representatives from non-profit organisations
to act as mediators at the "unification of democratic
opposition" under "Committee 2008" and subsequently,
"Civil Congress."
4) Parties' search for allies among non-profit organisations
and utilization of their networks to organise large scale
public events (marches in defense of freedom of speech, anti-fascist
marches, meetings, piquet) in Moscow and regions. The CPRF
and YABLOKO declare that such actions are their strategic
goal. The SPS (the Union of Right-Wing Forces) begins activities
of this sort only in 2006 and sponsors anti-fascist and human
rights marches. Since restrictions are imposed on public manifestations,
all political forces resort more and more often to non sanctioned
actions. Response of ruling authorities is to resort to force
and to employ pro Kremlin youth associations in public street
activities.
Inconsistency and non transparency of these processes remind
of public movements of the period of liberalization. Like
in those days, the nature of interaction of organizations
now is defined by the positions of leaders and by non formal
character of relations. Like in those days, conflicts and
splits are inevitable and are caused by differing interests
of individuals and the absence of institutional regulations.
Sequence of events at the Civil Congress and around it in
2006-2007 is very illustrative of the above. This organization
does not have well defined structure or mechanism for passing
resolutions and following them up. This is why many parties,
politicians and pseudo-politicians, especially those who failed
to create their own political parties, envisioned Congress
as a stage for establishing their political platform. Co-chairs
of VGK (All-Russia Civil Congress), G. Kasparov and G. Satarov,
as well as M. Kasyanov (the latter did not participate in
VGK's work per se) looked at VGK precisely from these positions.
"The Other Russia", which was organised by the "non-systemic"
politicians, from liberals to radical left, was meant to become
a political constituent of VGK. Such developments did not
appeal to the systemic parties participating in the Congress
- YABLOKO and the SPS. Serious conflict, which put on the
agenda the issue of loss of confidence in co-chairs, resulted
in the decision of the Congress (after its third annual gathering)
to accept the principle of individual membership. The task
which these parties pursued, depolitisation of VGK and delegitimation
of political ambitions of the above mentioned politicians,
was fulfilled. Both mentioned parties established their position
in relation to "Other Russia" in 2007. The position
is institutional non participation in the Congress. Individual
members, however, would not be banned from participation in
"marches of dissidents" or making speeches at the
Congress. This position became the reason for the accusations
against both parties by "The Other Russia" of their
"concert with the Kremlin."
There were several positions in regards to the future of democratic
forces among democratically oriented politicians and organizations.
The positions changed alongside changes in legislation and
failure of new political projects.
1) There is urgent need to create new Democratic Party because
"old democrats" lost their influence (V. Ryzhkov,
I. Khamakada, V. Lysenko and others). However, attempts to
create new parties or "blow life" into the old ones
failed. Proposed projects "Our Choice" of I. Khamakada,
"Green Russia" of A. Yablokov and even revival of
the parties of first generation - Republican Party of V. Ryzhkov
and V. Lysenko and Democratic Party of M. Kasyanov - were
not realized.
It appeared so that the number of democratically oriented
citizens in the regions is very small and those who are willing
to participate in political activities are already members
of parties or human rights organizations. The only way to
create a new party was to recruit members of YABLOKO or SPS,
who did not see any good reasons to leave their parties and
create personal resource to second-rank politicians. Audits
by registration bodies reduced to nil efforts to increase
numbers of party members. I. Khamakada rejected her project
in its initial stage and joined Kasyanov. V. Ryzhkov managed
to attract V. Melnikova and her supporters from the "Committee
of Soldiers' Mothers", however, it was very difficult
to build a party fast under new strict regulations. Registration
Committee brought a case of the RPR (the Republican party)
liquidation before the Supreme Court.
Kasyanov, who appeared to the Kremlin as the most dangerous
person because he expressed his willingness to run for the
President, was neutralized in a different way. The DPR (the
Democratic Party of Russia), which was de-facto a semi-virtual
structure and was offered for sale to prospective sponsors,
was simply purchased. Very pragmatic members of the party
leadership, who were waiting for a sponsor but did not want
to risk inevitable conflict with the ruling powers, made their
choice. The same scenario as in the case of the CPRF split
was used: an alternative congress. This time the plan worked
out better. A. Bogdanov, who used to work in the Central Executive
Committee of the United Russia in 2002-2003, was elected Chairman.
The DPR became a spoiler and Bogdanov started sending letters
to the leaders of regional organisations of YABLOKO and SPS
where he called them to unify on the basis of the DPR and
to abandon the old leaders. Leaflets of a similar content
followed, however all that did not produce any results. Kasyanov
announced that he was forming a new movement - People's Democratic
Union - which would be able, in case of necessity, to form
a basis for creation of a new party. In 2006, Kasyanov tried
unsuccessfully to be nominated as a presidential candidate
by the united right-left opposition. Kasyanov had played an
active role in the project "The Other Russia" until
his leaving the united right-left opposition in summer 2007,
when it became clear that the number of prospective candidates
was constantly increasing.
2) It is necessary to unite all democratic parties, first
and foremost YABLOKO and the SPS (G. Satarov, G. Kasparov,
a few members of the leadership of the SPS including B. Nadezhdin
and N. Belykh).
The main goal for most observers and participants of the political
process was "unification of democrats" and renunciation
of mutual demands. The leadership of YABLOKO put programmatic
principles and economic development of the country to the
forefront, while agreeing with the necessity of creation of
a United Democratic Party. Nadezhdin's suggestion to select
a party which would serve as a matrix for the unification
of democrats has been pronounced many times and best represents
position of the SPS. G. Kasparov established "Committee
2008" in 2004 with the purpose of realization of such
suggestion. The committee included well-known journalists,
public figures, human right activists. Representatives of
the SPS (Nemtsov, Nadezhdin) and YABLOKO (Ivanenko, Mitrokhin),
as well as I. Khamakada, V. Ryzhkov, G. Satarov, also participated
in the work of this committee. The work of the committee did
not yield any satisfactory results due to different visions
of tasks and claims of second-rank politicians to absolute
leadership.
The second attempt of this nature was the initiative of G.
Satarov and G. Kasparov, the co-chairs of All-Russian Civil
Congress (VGK). At the second Congress, they presented an
"ultimatum" of urgent unification of YABLOKO and
the SPS with everybody else. However, neither YABLOKO nor
the SPS needed such middlemen after elections to the Moscow
Duma.
Conference "The Other Russia", which took place
on the eve of G8 meeting in summer 2006, divided politicians
into two groups on the basis of their adherence to certain
democratic values: non systemic opposition - those who could
not meet normative requirements for participation in elections
and systemic opposition - those who had such chances or hoped
to get them after their registration with the Ministry of
Justice. YABLOKO and the SPS distanced themselves from this
enterprise. Kasyanov, Khamakada and Ryzhkov announced at the
conference the creation of a "permanent committee".
Participation of left radicals Anpilov and Limonov in this
conference marginalized this side of political specter and
diminished chances for unification.
The above mentioned third All-Russian Civil Congress weakened
the project even more. Kasyanov and Kasparov practically remained
in isolation and were shunned by political forces with large
resources and some public organizations, especially human
rights organization, who considered collaboration with National
Bolsheviks and RKRP (Russian Communist Workers’ Party) impermissible.
3) It is necessary to strengthen party's organizational structure
and to attract active politicians and organizations to the
party.
YABLOKO declared and consistently implemented this position
at the 12th Congress in 2004. The majority of the party's
leadership and regional organisations, unlike journalists
and public figures, did not consider a merger with the SPS
the only possibility. They even thought that such a merger
might bring more harm than dividends. The "matrix"
strategy was not acceptable to the party with more than a
decade-long history. YABLOKO consciously and consistently
worked on the establishment of a unified party on its own
basis. Interaction with network organisations within the framework
of the Civil Congress, in which the party played key role,
and structure of the YABLOKO-United Democrats list laid out
firm foundations for talks with the "Green Russia",
the Moscow Organisation of Soldiers' Mothers and human rights
organisations. Internal split and uncertainty of the SPS prospects
led to the situation when the SPS refused to participate in
the Moscow elections and SPS members were included into YABLOKO’s
list. 11.1% votes given for the SPS candidates allowed them
to create their own faction (alongside with United Russia
and communists) in the Moscow City Duma and even though this
victory did not give them political power in the Duma which
was dependent on Luzhkov, it did have symbolic character.
A possibility to form factions and assurances of procurement
of important positions in the party, alongside thickening
of electoral legislation and the law on parties, played the
decisive role in that some members of the "Green Russia"
and Soldiers' Mothers expressed their willingness to join
YABLOKO. Factions started to emerge on federal and regional
levels. This initiative gave impetus to politicized human
right activists to apply to YABLOKO. Youth and gender movements
which did not have formal status inside the party, received
formal status. Existence of five factions and some alterations
of the party program, mostly, enlargement of ecology section
of the program, allowed the party to announce the transformation
into a united party - the Russian United Democratic Party
YABLOKO. The Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO has become
the most significant and, probably, the sole, player in this
section of political specter. However, party's further existence
was threatened by institutional conditions under which party
functions, as well as by the complex position of party's system
opposition. Party's position of civil systemic opposition
appears quite complicated for both voters and party members
themselves. The party faced the following dilemma: to continue
play according to compulsive rules, to risk loss of face and
to become one of pro-Kremlin pseudo-democrats or to radicalize
itself and to lose systemic status.
Growth of Opposition Moods
Results of the State Duma elections December 2007 damaged
significantly positions of the democratic opposition. No one
among democratic parties overcame the 7% barrier. But in spite
of the growth of state revenue, consistent implementation
of policies with infringe rights of the citizens, lead in
this period to huge street protests which now acquire methodic
character. The most burning issues are price rises on housing
and communal services, prejudices to the rights of certain
groups of citizens (dormitory tenants, tenant builders, tenants
protesting against infill constructions or green land clearances
and so on). Some public events are organized, some are spontaneous.
The major organizer of these events is usually the CPRF. Liberal
parties and, above all, YABLOKO, starting with 2004, consistently
increase their presence in street public protests and later
move from mere participation to their organization. The Union
of the Right-Wing Forces (SPS) has also started to join public
events, including non-sanctioned events.
The other option for democratic opposition is dealt with infighting
caused transition of power from ongoing president to his successor.
This infighting cracks up the unity of political regime and
therefore may create additional options for oppositional activity.
Spontaneous events which are reminiscent of the protests of
the end of the 80s are becoming citizens' reaction to local
and national events. Infill construction in a certain house,
loss of bank deposits in certain banks, ban on importing cars
with the steering wheel on the right side, certain actions
of regional and local authorities mobilize active part of
citizens. The scale of the protests and the level of mobilization
are not comparable with the end of the 1980s. However, they
become noticeable. The ruling powers continue to react according
to the old scheme: restrict citizens' right to protest, change
legislation, resort to administrative measures and even to
violence. They begin to use methods tested in Chechnya: recourse
to "special events" and filtration stations. One
of such cases is reaction of Bashkotorstan police to public
street protests in Blagoveshchensk: 2.5% or more than 1000
people, inhabitants of the area were taken to these stations
and beaten up. This forces even systemic opposition to recourse
to non sanctioned events every so often.
New forms of mobilization and new forms of actions appear.
Participants can get together with the help of blogs. They
use short spectator events (flash-mob) which are intended
to attract journalists rather than passers-by. Numbers of
youth and politicized movements participating in such actions
increase.
Ruling powers also use new forms of reaction to protests.
They create pro-Kremlin youth movements ("Marching Together,"
"Nashi" ["Our People"], "The Young
Guard". Regional authorities in regions where governors
belong to the top echelon of United Russia create similar
regional groups (for example, Mestniye - "Locals"
in the Moscow region). The major function of these organisations
is to participate in public events in support of ruling rowers.
Total annihilation of democratic institutions has not happened
yet. There is still possibility of choice. Final renunciation
of democracy as transitional solution, creation of chain of
command with dominant party and subordinate parties - satellites
and imitations of opposition - with no options for election
results (transfer of power from the President to his successor
or staying in presidency for the third term) will turn parties
into an element of authoritarian regime. In such a case, the
system, due to its endogenous instability, will have to go
back to the starting point of transformation.
See also:
Democratic
Coalition
YABLOKO
and SPS
YABLOKO
and the Parties of Power
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