The present situation and prospects of Russia’s foreign policy
provoke much concern.
The situation in the Russian Federation has considerably
aggravated for the past several years, especially for the
past year. The global economic crisis and drop of demand in
energy as well as slump of energy prices have sharply worsened
the position of our country in the world economy and trade,
considerably lowered the state revenue and again made us face
the problems of foreign debt (a corporate debt yet) and budget
and payment balance deficits. Russia’s economy oriented on
the raw exports saw virtually no attempts of its replacement
by a diversified model in the past years (despite multiple
appeals and oaths by the Russian government), and such economy
turned out to be very vulnerable in the crisis.
Russia will have to make a choice soon: whether to make
its domestic and foreign ambitions commensurate with its modest
revenue compared to that of the beginning of 2000s or to channel
its energy exports to Asia. However, such plans of channeling
raw exports to Asia are, first, very difficult in implementation,
and, second, even their realization, if such takes place,
will not lead to a qualitative change in the situation. Instead
of playing the role of a “raw appendix” for the West Russia
risks turning into a “raw appendix” for China, India and other
BRIC countries, that are largely regarded as appendices to
the innovative economies of the USA, the European Union and
Japan.
However, Russia has also another way of development – among
the industrially developed democratic states. This requires
deep transformations of its economy and export structure,
that should base on high technologies, implies a real rather
than “decorative” democratization of its political and socio-economic
spheres, as well as needs significant correction of its foreign
policies. In spite of frequent successes in the development
of integration in the post-Soviet space (EurAsEC and CSTO),
this decade Russia failed to create a firm new basis for interaction.
The loyalty of Russia’s neighbors, with a rare exception,
directly depends on the degree of authoritarity or their political
regimes. However, authoritarian states, in contrast to democratic
states, are genetically incapable of a true integration. They
may be capable only of subordination of the weaker to the
stronger - an unreliable basis for cooperation (which is once
again confirmed by the recent dispute with Russia’s allegedly
closest neighbour – Byelorussia).
In spite of Moscow’s appealing to Article 51 of the UN Charter
(the right of nations to collective or individual self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations),
none of the CSTO allies supported Russia during its military
operation in August 2008. And further none of Russia’s partners
in CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC, SCO and BRIC followed Russia in recognizing
independence of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russia’s use of force for protection of civilians from the
military adventurism of Saakashvili’s regime was justified,
however, the following recognition of independence of the
South Ossetia and Abkhazia created considerable difficulties
for Russia’s foreign policies. In the past Russia had made
the territorial integrity principle a corner-stone of its
policies in Chechnya and Kosovo, but in August 2008 this principled
position was undermined by its policies in the Southern Caucasus.
Now Russia is completely alone in OSCE in the issues of independence
of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which hinders promotion
of its initiatives on the new treaty and the new architecture
of the European Security.
For the post-Soviet space this creates a dangerous precedent
on the whole territory of the former USSR, and the closed
nature and unpredictability of the regime in the South Ossetia,
as well as naturally arising suspicions about Moscow’s annexationist
intentions become the problems of prime concern here, rather
than Georgia’s position. Russia obtained over 1,000 km of
a hostile southern border, which may become especially dangerous
in case of another disturbance in the Northern Caucasus. Moreover,
having recognized the independence of the South Ossetia and
Abkhazia the Russian government undertook the liability for
foreign and domestic policies of their governments and considerably
limited prospects for the Russian diplomacy in settling conflicts
in the Caucasus. All this created serious problems in the
context of the new architecture of the European Security and
Russia’s negotiations both with the CIS countries and the
NATO states.
Very likely attempts to profit from the instability in Ukraine
(especially in view of the forthcoming election) and to provoke
a conflict over Crimea and a number of Eastern and Southern
Ukrainian regions are especially dangerous for Russia in the
short term. Use of force in this region will as a minimum
ruin the CIS and the CSTO, lead to a new variant of a cold
war with NATO and disrupt all the plans of socio-economic
transformations in Russia. In the worst development this may
make Russia prone to a national disaster.
Russia’s relations with Western countries have been going
through the most difficult period for the past twenty years,
since the end of the cold war. The European Security system
has been virtually paralyzed and Russia’s negotiations on
entering the WTO and a new Partnership and Cooperation Treaty
with the European Union have been stagnating for many years,
and very sketchy interaction between the RF and NATO has been
frozen. In response to the “privileged interests region” concept
declared by Moscow, the European Union proposed the “Eastern
Partnership” idea for this region. Russia’s rivalry with the
US/NATO in the post-Soviet space and the Middle East has been
aggravating, and in the perspective it may spread on the Caribbean,
the Arctic and other regions.
The system of limitation and reduction of nuclear and conventional
weapons has been almost completely dismantled. In spite of
the beginning of intensive negotiations between the RF and
the USA, the prospects for a new treaty that has to replace
expiring in December 2009 START-1 are vague. The non-proliferation
regime exacerbated by the Iranian and the North Korean nuclear
and missile programmes is also under threat. In spite of the
fact that the key responsibility lies on the ex-leadership
of the USA (broadening of NATO, the war in Iraq and the ABM
plans), Russia failed to efficiently oppose such policies
and often even encouraged these with its foreign and domestic
policies. The first successful summits of the new Presidents
of Russia and the USA and positive decisions within the framework
of the present bilateral relations with certain Western countries
can not turn the general unfavourable tide.
Russia’s relationships with China will remain favourable
for a short and mid-term, however in the long term they may
bring great uncertainty and huge problems for Russia, especially
in view of a deepening economic, demographic and ecological
crisis in Siberia and Far East. In the situation of steady
growth of Russia’s vulnerability and dependence on China,
cooperation of the RF with Japan, the USA and South Korea
in the Pacific region has been insignificant.
Opportunistic advances to the mixed parts of the Islamic
world (application for membership in the Muslim League, the
gas OPEC idea, recognition of HAMAS and an unruffled reaction
on acquittal of Hitler’s crimes by the Iranian leadership)
provoke disdain towards Russia from all without exception
political forces in this specific part of the world community
rather than increase Russia’s “weight”. The end of the US
war in Iraq which is quite likely in the foreseeable future
and curbing of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan – in case of
Russia’s tacit counter-action (Manas) and growth of Taliban’s
resistance – are likely to lead to a situation when Russian
troops will again have to fight against Islamic extremists
in the Central Asia, Northern Caucasus and probably other
Russian regions. And this will have to be done in a hostile
environment of NATO and some former Soviet republics.
Moscow’s policies towards the developing countries of the
past years have been demonstrating a line towards supporting
(projects of delivery of weapons and nuclear reactors, negotiation
of construction of military bases) of authoritarian radical
anti-Western regimes: Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Iran,
Syria, Sudan, Myanma, etc. However, the experience of the
USSR demonstrates too well that cooperation with such regimes
is often economically costly and politically unreliable: they
may collapse in any moment due to their inner reasons, or
flop to those who will pay more, or draw Moscow into their
adventurist projects.
Russia’s increased military activity after the August 2008
crisis in the Caucasus often turned counter-productive. Such
were the demonstration flights to the Latin America of outdated
strategic bomber aircrafts, a cruise of warships to the Caribbean,
and more frequent (and not often successful) tests of ballistic
missiles, as well as grandiose military parades accompanied
by formidable warnings to a “possible aggressor” from Russia’s
military and civil leaders.
Western public takes this as an emerging Russian “military
threat”, while NATO’s professional policymakers regard this
as attempts of self-assertion, sidetracking of public attention
from stagnation of the military reform, playing on patriotic
moods inside Russia and teasing the USA with the use of inadequate
military means (“sham” as they say in Pentagon).
In addition to mass-scale errors and miscalculations of Western
policies throughout the past two decades, instability of Russia’s
position in the present dynamic system of international relations,
as well as a discrepancy between its foreign ambitions and
economic potential and the level of its technological and
socio-political development condition the growth of problems
in Russia’s foreign policy.
Uncertainty (in contrast to the “equidistance”) of Russia’s
place and role on the international arena reflect the ongoing
struggle around Russia’s choice of the way of development:
either democratic or authoritarian. The need of replacement
of the economic model based on the raw exports by a diversified
and innovative model pushes to the first way, however, inertia
and protectively selfish of the state-oligarchic elite drag
toward the second way.
This results in fragmentariness of the foreign policies
which is often presented as a “different vectors” concept.
This also conditions that reactive nature of the policies
and deficit of large-scale well-considered initiatives (projects
that emerge from time to time turn out quite shallow, as,
for example, the new architecture of the European Security
or rouble as a world reserve currency, or the BRIC virtual
alliance, etc.). This is the key reason of snowballing complications,
stagnation and deadlocks in all the “azimuths” of Russia’s
relations with the outer world, together with deepening backwardness
of Russia’s economy oriented on the raw exports and retrogressive
nature of its political system.
The Russian United Democratic Party
YABLOKO finds that Russia’s foreign policy requires corrections,
in some cases quite substantial and urgent:
1. It is high time for Russia to determine its basic position
in the world. We think that Russia’s place is among the democratic
states that in practice share the humanistic values of the
European civilization, which Russia genetically belongs to,
and reject any extremism, totalitarianism, imperialism and
odious regimes dangerous both for their citizens and worldwide.
We are certain that such a course envisages real rather than
“decorative” strengthening of the country’s defence, also
such policies envisage efficient development of mutually beneficial
relations with China, India and other countries (by the way,
here the USA, the EU states and Japan have been much more
successful than Russia).
The present Russia’s trends towards growth of authoritarianism
and corruption, neoimperialism, rehabilitation of Stalin and
his regime, unbridled anti-Western propaganda in the mass
media are a serious obstacle for formation of efficient foreign
and defence policies, as well as domestic and economic policies.
Principled and consistent counteraction to all these trends
on behalf of the sound part of the society and the authority
is an irrefutable condition for urgent correction of its international
course and formation of modern and efficient foreign and defence
policies.
2. Instead of developing loose (“umbrella”) integration plans
for the post-Soviet space, Russia should definitely formulate
its economic, military and other interests toward each of
the CIS countries, abolishing neoimperialist ideas and dangerous
geopolitical fantasies.
Russia can efficiently prevent broadening of NATO in the
post-Soviet space, first of all positioning itself as a guarantor
of their territorial integrity and sovereignty developing
mutually beneficial and equal relations in all the spheres
of mutual interests. Multilateral guarantees of territorial
integrity of the CIS countries should be provided within the
framework of the new architecture of the European Security.
First of all, Russia should normalize its relations with Ukraine.
Voluntary rapprochement of the CIS countries with the EU can
not be resisted in principle, but it should not leave Russia
aside, it should be coordinated (with consideration of all
the socio-economic links) with the development of relations
between the EU and Russia.
3. Stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan is Russia’s
vital interest. It is reasonable to broaden NATO’s rights
to transit of military cargos through the Russian territory.
In the perspective we should consider sending military advisers
and special CSTO troops for participation in control over
the northern part of Afghanistan (however, excluding sending
there Russia’s ground troops). Military and political participation
in control over the northern territories of this failed state
will contribute to Russia’s security, including hindering
drugs traffic via Central Asia, Kazakhstan and its border.
In this respect we could also work on NATO’s recognition of
CSTO which will become an important precedent for European
security too.
4. Russia should take a firm and principled position on
Iran’s nuclear programme so that to achieve implementation
of United Nations Security Council resolutions by Teheran.
This is required, first, for prevention of a new war in the
region and, second, for maintenance of non-proliferation regime
and raising of efficiency of Russia’s policies in different
important issues of interaction with other permanent Security
Council members.
5. Considering the fact that Russia’s position and role in
the Pacific will be the most important factor of its international
position, souverenity and territorial integrity in the 21st
century, it is necessary to balance Russia’s links with China
with the development of economic and political relations with
the USA, Japan and South Korea.
The key condition for raising of the role and influence of
Russia in the Asia-Pacific is its consistent policies of socio-economic
and ecological resurgence of Russia’s Siberia and Far East,
provision of ample defence and protection of the borders,
re-population of these regions, asserting the rule of law
there and encouraging of domestic and foreign investments.
6. Russia should reduce its demonstrative military activity
and the tone of the accompanying militant declarations. The
present growing gap between Russia and the West in the general-purpose
forces and an exaggerated role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s
defence are manifestations of a failure of its military reform.
Implementing consistent measures in the housing policy, military
reform, curbing of corruption and crime, combat training and
technical re-equipment we shall be able to strengthen the
defense and bring respect from progressive military states.
A serious Russia’s initiative on creation jointly with NATO,
Japan, China and India of a permanent grouping of naval forces
against maritime piracy would be much better than rhetorics
and staged performances.
7. Russia should change its “hunker down” stance in the
disarmament issues and set forth a complex of proposals on
reduction and limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons
in bilateral and multilateral formats and strengthening of
non-proliferation regime for the weapons of mass destruction.
Without progress in the way of nuclear disarmament (which
has been envisaged by the process throughout several decades)
it will be impossible to prevent further spread of nuclear
weapons and, finally, its getting into the hands of terrorists,
which would make Russia the most vulnerable among the super-powers.
In addition, nuclear disarmament is a powerful lever for Russia
in achieving agreements on ABM systems, conventional weapons,
space systems and reductions of armaments of the third nuclear
powers. Russia should stimulate this process and format it
developments according to our interests, rather than hamper
it.
8. At the forecasted rates of nuclear and missile proliferation
the circle of potential threats of missile strikes on Russia
and its allies will be broadening. The situation for the USA
and their allies develops in the same way. Therefore, it is
unrealistic and counterproductive to hope on complete “closing”
of the ABM programme, in spite of the fact that it has been
undergoing revision at present. This creates favourable conditions,
taking into account the range of substantial common threats
to the security of Russia, the US, their allies, for active
efforts in creation of a joint ABM system of Russia, USA/NATO
and the European Union.
9. Asserting lawful Russia’s interests in the Arctic we
should not focus on a unilateral seizure of Arctic natural
resources and resurgence of military confrontation with other
Arctic countries (that are NATO members and considerably exceed
Russia in economic and naval potentials). We should promote
in every possible way the idea of international cooperation
in ecologically safe exploitation of Arctic resources and
joint use of the thawing Northern Sea Route.
10. The urgent correction of Russia’s foreign policies envisages
its definite and clear position in the international system
as one of the leading powers of the Euroatlantic community
which will considerably strengthen its position in relation
to the West, East and South. Having clearly stated long-term
foreign policy goals, this course envisages (in contrast to
the policies of 1990s) a firm policy towards asserting Russia’s
national interests in every definite issue of its relations
with the West and promotion of Russia’s view of the ways and
means for strengthening of the world economy and international
security. Active and not reactive foreign policies should
be strategically and tactically commensurate with the present
resources and goals of creating favourable outer conditions
for accelerated modern socio-economic and political development
of the country.
______________________________________________________________________
* Draft document submitted by Alexei Arbatov in light of
Grigory Yavlinsky’s proposals
See also:
Russia and NATO
Relationships between Russia and Georgia,
Russia-EU Relations
Russia-US Relations
Only truth can be set against distortion of history. Press Release, May 27, 2009 | 