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Putin can control the Russian domestic environment and he can
provide consistency for arms control agreements, which Russia
may engage in with other countries. Neither of these two characteristics
were true of the Yeltsin Regime, during the 1990s. That is good
news and certainly a very important change. But there is bad news,
and let me talk about it in much greater detail.
The bad news is that ratification of START II and part of CTBT
in Russia was motivated by interest and arguments and commitments
that may not be very encouraging for the United States, and that
may be objected to by many people in institutions in the United
States. The future process may entail great new difficulties,
which the two countries will have to overcome. There are three
principal aspects of the "bad news" with respect to START II.
Let me start with the substance of this issue. It is an absolute
fact, and a very deplorable fact, that START II was ratified in
Russia by the Russian Parliament not because Russians think that
the threat is lower, not because Russians think that nuclear weapons
are less relevant, nor because the Russian Parliament and public
opinion thinks that the United States will be a partner for cooperation
and security. It’s is the other way around. START II was primarily
ratified because Russian public and political elite thinks that
the nuclear threat is great and that the United States is keen
on achieving superiority. And that nuclear weapons are still as
relevant as ever for Russian security and U.S.-Russian relations.
The principal argument in favor of START II, which proved so instrumental,
was that without START II Russians forces, with a shortage of
funding, would go down in ten years to 1,000 warheads on their
own. This is because old systems would be withdrawn and new systems
would be introduced at a very low rate and in very small numbers.
At the same time, the United States can easily afford to maintain
the present level of its strategic forces. In this way, if there
is no further arms control agreement, in ten years the United
States may, inadvertently, acquire nuclear forces that are five
or six times over that of Russia – basically free, without spending
additional money. They may achieve the goal that proved to be
impossible for them to achieve over five decades of Cold War.
That was the principal argument that persuaded many members of
Parliament to vote for START II. These figures were officially
given, many times in closed hearings and, eventually, during open
sessions of parliament held by President Putin for the ratification
of START II.
If Russia were to preserve its forces at the level of START
I, which is six to seven thousand nuclear warheads, then during
10 years Russian would have to spend about $33 billion only on
strategic nuclear forces and C3I systems. That is 950 billion
rubles. It would mean spending 65% of its total defense budget
yearly only on strategic nuclear forces. If Russia were to keep
its forces at the level of START II, which is about 3,000 weapons,
then it would have to spend $26 billion during the next ten years,
which would annually account for about 50% of its overall defense
budget. If Russia was to maintain its forces at the level agreed
in the START III agreement, which is around 2,000 weapons, then
we would have to spend $14 billion in the next ten years – which
would be about 27% of our present budget.
That was the first time in an open hearing at a high official
level that some description of the dynamic model of strategic
balance -- which is basically a model of strategic exchange --
was revealed by President Putin. In particular, he said that under
the first scenario, if the United States keeps its forces at the
level of START I and Russia goes down because of shortage of funding,
then in 10 years the American deterrent capability, that is a
second strike capability, would be 15 times bigger than Russia’s
second strike capability. At the level of START II the United
States would have triple the superiority of Russia in the remaining
delayed second strike retaliatory capability. Under START III
there would be approximate parity between the two sides, which
implies that for Russia, the ratification of START II, is primarily
a way to reduce the American nuclear threat. Secondly, to maintain
parity at lower costs than would otherwise be the case. Thirdly,
to open the door to START III to preserve parity, not just in
numbers of warheads, but in dynamic measures of strategic balance,
of which, one of the measures is the ratio of secondary strike
retaliatory capability. That was very persuasive for members of
Parliament, making a big impressionon them.
The fear of American nuclear superiority and the fear of the
United States was the principal motive for many members of Parliament
to vote for START II. I want to make a very important reservation.
Of course, 33 billion rubles spent only on strategic forces during
the next 10 years, is an enormous sum of money for Russia. Spending
65% of the budget means that nothing will be left for the conventional
forces and for all other functions for Russia armed forces.
However, the situation is not completely hopeless. For instance,
if need be, Russia could still maintain strategic parity, even
at the level of START I. To do this it would be necessary for
Russia to raise its defense budget from the present 2.8% of GNP
to 3.5% of GNP. This was actually implied in the Presidential
directive that was signed three years ago, but which was never
fulfilled in the real planning for the Russian defense budget.
3.5% this year would mean an additional 40 billion rubles, which
is about $1.5 billion of the Russian defense budget, which now
stands at 146 billion rubles. In addition to that Russia would
need to reduce the numbers of its forces further -- primarily
its conventional forces. If it reduces its forces by 30% from
1.2 million men to 80, 000 men it could save about 30% on maintenance
and transfer that money to research and development, procurement
and construction.
Under such circumstances, Russia would be able to maintain even
the present level of forces of five to six thousand warheads,
which is the level of START I. However, certainly nobody wants
to do this. Some people, in particular the armed forces and the
Minister of Defense, do not want further reductions in personnel,
while the Minister of Finance does not want a further increase
in the defense budget. Democrats and liberals, like myself, would
like both. However we would like to spend the money not on nuclear
forces, which are to never be used, but rather to transform Russia
into an all volunteer army, to improve the standard of living
and to support the most advance branches of the defense industry
. This is possible but certainly not desirable and that was the
principal motive for many members of Parliament to vote for START
II.
The second motive, which may also not be greeted very enthusiastically
here in the United States, is that Russian considers START II
to be an additional guarantee of the viability and validity of
the ABM Treaty of 1972. Under START II the linkage between START
and the ABM Treaty is much more stringent and unequivocal than
under START I. Besides, Putin made a very strong commitment, which
is on record, that if the United States unilaterally withdrew
form the ABM Treaty, Russia will withdraw from START II, and will
go in for new MIRVed ICBM’s. And he also said, and I can quote
him, that Russia will withdraw from all the regimes of arms control,
including conventional arms control.
That is the substance of the matter and the motives for ratification
as far as the START II is concerned. The second point is about
the legal aspect of it. We have ratified many treaties by adopting
a law on ratification, not by just making unilateral reservations
and statements. There was a law that was adopted on the ratification
of START II, which consists of nine articles. Some of them may
be of particular interest to you and once again may not be met
with great enthusiasm here in the United States.
In article 2 of this law it is stated clearly that America withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty will be considered the threat to supreme national
interest, which will imply Russian withdrawal from START II.
Article 4, clearly states that if agreement on START III, the
next treaty, is not reached by December 31, 2003, once again Russia
will consider withdrawal from START II Treaty. I should remind
you that this a very important date because the year after that,
by December 31, 2004, the second stage of reduction under START
II will begin. By that time Russia will not have completed its
reduction, it will only have reached the level of 4,000 weapons
all together, 2,000 weapons of submarines, 1,200 MIRVed ICBM’s
and 650 heavy MIRVed ICBM’s. So Russia will see if progress on
START III is good enough and then decide whether she will go to
the next stage, which implies further reductions and complete
elimination of MIRVed ICBM’s and of heavymissiles.
Finally, article 9 of that law, the most technical and most unpleasant,
states that Russia will not actually start to implement the treaty,
and will not exchange ratification documents with the United States
until the United States ratifies the 1997 documents that were
signed in New York. These documents deal with the five-year extension
of the START II implementation. Most important is the delineation
between strategic and tactical ballistic missile defenses. President
Clinton at that time made an open and clear commitment to bring
those documents for ratification as soon as Russia ratifies the
Basic Treaty. Now the time has come. That is the linkage which
basically will put START II on hold until the United States takes
steps towards ratifying those two protocols. Without the two protocols
it is impossible to start implementing START II because the time
frame in the Basic Treaty that was ratified by the United States
and that in the treaty that Russia is going to implement is very
different. The difference is as big as 5 years.
The final point about the "bad news" is the way in which the
Russia Duma ratified this treaty and the way in which the ratification
of START II reflects Russian domestic public opinion with respect
to arms control and the United States.
The Russia Duma ratified documents, which were signed in 1997,
in particular, the memorandum on delineation between strategic
and tactical ballistic missile defenses. A vast majority of 92%
voted in favor. And Russia ratified START II with a majority of
64% in favor. It was still a pretty solid majority, and I actually
did not expect it to be that big – I expected the margin to be
smaller. As you know we need 226 votes to ratify a treaty, simple
majority, and START II received 288. I expected the margin to
be, at most, 20 or 30 votes. Why and how was the margin bigger?
This is a very important issue. Among the factions in the Russian
parliament, those who would vote in favor of START II under any
circumstances are the Yabloko faction, the Fatherland Party, Union
of Right Forces and Russia’s Regions, which all together make
up precisely 123 votes. Those who voted against START II, and
would vote against START II under any circumstances, are the Communists
and the Agrarians, and they account for 121 votes. Approximately
equal. The decisive package, which resolved the destiny of START
II, 155 votes came from Unity faction, People’s Deputy and Zhirinovsky’s
party. And even the name implies that certainly those people voted
for START II, not because they want arms control, not because
they approve of the United States policy, not because they want
further progress and cooperation on security issues. If left to
their own judgement, I know most of the people in those parties
-- I’m absolutely sure that 70% of them -- would vote against
START II. But they are disciplined parties, governmental parties
that were created by the government and by the President and they
voted in favor of START II because the Kremlin told them to do
so. Otherwise, 30% of them would vote again, and against START
II and it would never be ratified. This reflects very clearly
the approximate spectrum of the public opinion towards arms control,
toward cooperation with the United States and towards relations
toward the United States in general. About 130 in favor, 130 against,
and 155 who are in the middle, but who would follow what the government
tells them.
This is a more of a manipulated and regulated democracy than
we had during the previous Duma. It is very fortunate that the
government and president were in favor of arms control.
That is why this manipulated democracy supported them. If Putin
were against some agreements, the vast majority of the Duma --
70% -- would support Putin. If Putin doesn’t agree with the compromise
on START III, or if Putin decides to retaliate against American
withdrawal from the ABM treaty 70%-80% of the Duma would support
him. This would correspond not only to their way of behaving and
being obedient to the President, but in many respects would reflect
their inner instincts and political preferences.
Now let me say a few words about CTBT. It was passed in the Duma
much more smoothly, without such a great debate, and without such
great attention. However, the arguments in favor of CTBT were
also not necessarily very encouraging either for the American
government, – the Executive Branch -- which is in favor of CTBT,
or for the American arms control community. The first and principal
argument in favor of CTBT was that it will not enter into force,
anyway, before the United States and a number of other countries
ratify it. It was largely seen as a symbolic gesture.
The second consideration was that Russia is not going to violate
the moratorium on nuclear tests anyway. And if the United States
or some other country does that, then Russia will be able to do
the same and the CTBT will not be an obstacle.
Finally, since Russia is not going to violate the moratorium
on nuclear tests, it has to maintain stewardship of its nuclear
arsenal without natural tests. That needs additional funding,
which is very difficult to obtain in the absence of the CTBT Treaty.
CTBT was linked directly with additional funding for the stewardship
of Russia’s strategic arsenal.
In conclusion, let me say that there were times in the history
of Russian-American relations in arms control, when the political
environment was very favorable towards progress in arms control,
but technical issues proved to be an obstacle. That was true,
in particular, in 1963 when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed
instead of a comprehensive test ban treaty, because some technical
obstacles prevented countries from going for the larger treaty.
It was the same in 1972 when after limiting ballistic missile
defenses, the sides they were unable to stop or ban MIRV systems,
because technical issues prevented reliable verification – and
at that time neither side was willing to go into such intrusive
verification models, such as we are using now.
This time it is different. I think that, talking about the next
steps for arms control, it is possible to give a set of steps
that technically, would not be very difficult and would bring
us real progress. First of all, the US Senate has to ratify the
1997 documents, then both sides have to agree on the START III
Treaty, going down to 1000-1,500 warheads. And may be we can revise
the protocol to the ABM treaty, so that the United States may
develop its desired ABM deployment area in Alaska. Also the United
States needs to ratify CTBT, so that we can move on to a more
stringent non-proliferation regime, and bring India and Pakistan
into the CTBT as well. These are technical steps, which, from
a technical point of view, are not very difficult. However, in
contrast to some times in the past, the political environment
is quite hostile to such progress in arms control.
First of all domestically, in the United States and in Russia,
the moods are not very conducive to flexibility, or to making
compromise on important national security issues. I have described
the moods in Russia and you may tell me about the mood in the
United States, although I have a general impression about what
the US Congress thinks, and about what US public opinion thinks
about the issue.
International environment is also not very conducive because
we have entered the period of numerous contradictions on various
issues of international security. Nonetheless, the ball is now
in the American court; it is up to the United States to make further
steps. Whatever criticism may be made against Russia, and I am
one of those who criticizes Russian conduct and Russian policy
quite regularly, certainly it is up to the United States to make
a wise next step. If it is done we may achieve a real breakthrough
in arms control, which will make it easier for us to come to an
accommodation on European affairs, on Iran, on China, and many
other issues of international security. However, if that does
not happen, the new deadlock of arms control, and maybe even the
disintegration of the arms control system will greatly aggravate
the contradictions that we have in the world at large. That will
be extremely detrimental to international security and the to
the security of Russia, and the United States as well. Let me
finish on that optimistic note!
See also: http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/arbatov051600.htm
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