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I am delighted to speak with such a distinguished group and I
want to thank you each for giving me this opportunity today. As
a student of Russian history and society, I appreciate the important
role of Russian thinkers and intellectuals. To a large degree,
you shape the way Russians view the West. I occasionally look
at the Russian press myself and have seen what some of you have
written, as well as what has been written about me. I am glad
to say that I've been called worse things in the American press
than my Russian nickname "Gaspozha Stal."
As the Cold War was ending, Georgi Arbatov commented that "we
will do a terrible thing to you; we will deprive you of an enemy."
He was wrong on one point. It was not a terrible thing. I am delighted
that we have rejected any return to the confrontation of the past.
Ever since the Russian tricolor was raised over the Kremlin,
our relationship has been strong and getting stronger. Vast numbers
of Russians and Americans are being united by the forces of trade
and commerce. We continue to reduce and dismantle Cold War arsenals.
We have already banned nuclear testing forever. We will be partners
at the Summit of the Eight in Denver. In Bosnia, our soldiers
are partners in the truest sense of the word, sharing the same
risks and the same achievements.
An important part of my message to the American public and Congress
is the need for new thinking about Russia, because we are dealing
with a fundamentally new Russia. One reason I am here today is
to say we need new thinking on all sides, including in Russia,
as you think about the United States, Europe, and the new NATO
that is evolving. I know that many Russians are troubled by NATO's
decision to add new members. I want to speak with you frankly
about this issue today, so that you will understand exactly what
our motives are and what they are not.
First, I want you to understand that a new and enlarged NATO
will not pose an enlarged threat to Russia. On the contrary: Since
1991, NATO members' defense budgets have decreased by 30%. NATO's
land forces are down by 25%. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe have
been cut by 90% and no NATO nuclear forces are on alert today.
The building at NATO headquarters where we once planned our response
to a Soviet attack on Berlin now houses a Russian general and
staff helping to plan our effort in Bosnia.
In the foreseeable security environment NATO has no intention,
no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory
of any new state. Our CFE proposals will ensure that each state
maintains only those military capabilities needed for its legitimate
individual or collective security needs. So no NATO member, old
or new, can become a staging ground for potential attack against
Russia. That is not just matter of political intention. It is
a matter of military capability.
Second, you should recognize that we view NATO enlargement as
part of a broader effort to build a peaceful, undivided Europe,
in which Russia plays an important role. It is our firm conviction
that this effort is not a zero sum game in which Russia must lose
if central Europe gains, and central Europe must lose if Russia
gains. Most of all, it is why we want to develop a NATO-Russia
charter -- one that embodies our solemn, enduring commitment at
the highest political level, to undertake a fundamentally different
relationship with Russia.
Our proposals would establish a permanent NATO-Russia Joint Council,
which will give Russia a voice in key decisions that affect its
security interests in Europe. We would be able to act together
to fight proliferation, to keep nuclear arsenals safe and to respond
to humanitarian crises. NATO and Russian officers would work side
by side as equals, planning joint military operations from the
moment they are approved.
If Russia feels it has reason to fear that NATO is adopting a
threatening posture, or taking actions elsewhere in Europe that
concern Russia, it would be able to consult with NATO in an open,
timely and cooperative fashion. In other words, the Charter, together
with CFE adaptation and our commitment to achieve legally binding
strategic parity through START III, provide arrangements that
protect Russia's vital interests.
Third, I hope you will understand that to us, enlargement is
an essential part of the effort to build a new, post-Cold War
NATO. A few years ago, NATO's leaders faced a simple choice: Would
our alliance be known forever as an organization of nations that
were once arrayed against an empire that no longer exists? Or
will it be known as an organization of like-minded democracies
united to meet the challenges of the future?
If the second choice is right, then NATO's Cold War membership
will not do. Our alliance has to be open to those countries that
can contribute to its goals today. It can't lock out a group of
countries because they once fell on one side of an arbitrary Cold
War dividing line -- a line that did as much to isolate Russia
from Europe as it did any other nation.
Fourth, I hope you will come to see that NATO enlargement will
make a positive contribution to the security of all of Europe.
It should go without saying that Russia will benefit from the
resolution of ethnic and border disputes in central Europe. This
is the effect enlargement is already having.
NATO membership will give these countries the confidence they
need to pursue regional arms control and to build closer relations
with Russia. In fact, it is precisely because NATO is taking in
new members that we can now avert the threat of a major military
build-up in central Europe. Central Europeans want to join NATO
for the same reasons that current members would never leave it.
They want to be part of an integrated Europe that is anchored
to the United States.
If you suggest that Russia and NATO should negotiate over the
heads of these countries -- if you suggest we should somehow agree
to derail their aspirations -- you will ignite the very fears
in central Europe that you are trying to extinguish.
Let me ask you to consider what would happen if NATO, on Russian
advice, decided not to enlarge. Old dividing lines would re-emerge
in the heart of Europe. Confidence would disintegrate in many
of the new democracies. And a new, destabilizing scramble for
security would result. Central Europeans would blame Russia; the
progress you have made in establishing normal relations with them
would crumble. These countries would seek to build up their own
armed forces. A meaningful CFE treaty could not be negotiated.
There would be little chance of building a closer relationship
between NATO and Russia. The cooperation we've already forged
-- the joint exercises, joint training, and military liaison offices
-- could well disappear.
I know it will take time for the progress of trust in the NATO-Russia
relationship to catch up with the process of change in Europe.
But you are among the most influential opinion leaders in your
country. Even if you continue to believe that on balance NATO
enlargement is unwise, I do hope you will help inform Russia's
people and its leaders that they are dealing with a new NATO.
In the meantime, we all need to reflect on how we manage the
differences that arise in even the closest relationship. There
have been times, as you all know, when the United States has strongly
disagreed with Russian policies. In these cases, we have spoken
openly and forcefully, but we have also made clear our determination
to keep working together. None of us have the luxury of making
a list of differences and walking away.
That is why we will continue our effort to work out a relationship
between NATO and Russia. It does not have to happen now; the important
thing is to get it right. And that is why we must stay focused
on the unique responsibility Russia and America share: to keep
strengthening our relationship and our cooperation in building
a more stable, inclusive and democratic world.
I welcome any questions you may have.
See the original at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970502.html
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